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Straw Purchase Question

According to the Supreme Court, it's only a straw purchase if the ultimate owner advances the money for the purchase.

"Buying if for" someone is not a straw purchase if the ultimate owner reimburses the in store purchaser after the purchase.

The problem arises that now that the Supreme Court has set down some reasonably bright lines, BATF makes absolutely NO effort to educate the public or FFL about the elements of a straw purchase.

I have watched FFLs decline sales where the man says "I'm buying this for my wife" who is with him and looking at guns, although that is a perfectly legal sale, if he is the source of funds and intends it as a gift. He doesn't have to say the magic words, " I am buying this gun, as a gift for my wife."
what if the wife is a felon
 
Long confusing document. I have been digging through it but haven't found this particular ruling "According to the Supreme Court, it's only a straw purchase if the ultimate owner advances the money for the purchase.".

Can you point to me which page you gleaned this from?

I did notice that Justice Scalia agrees with me with the dissent. :)

Thanks,

Rosewood

Supreme Court decisions tend to be that way.
 
Supreme Court decisions tend to be that way.
My first question to the ATF or any LE organization on questioning the provenance of any particular firearm I may or may not have, how I obtained it, or whether I have 'proof' of purchase is to reply, "What statute requires that I have to have said 'proof,' and Where is your warrant (as in 'was this gun used in some crime, etc.') and/or probable cause justification for this persecution?"
 
This is a real interesting statement from the court. Can be used against the ATF on lots of their rulings namely reclassifying AR pistols.


(“[W]e have never held that the Government’s reading of acriminal statute is entitled to any deference”). We think ATF’s old position no more relevant than its current one—which is to say, not relevant at all. Whether the Govern-ment interprets a criminal statute too broadly (as it some-times does) or too narrowly (as the ATF used to in constru-ing §922(a)(6)), a court has an obligation to correct its error."

Hmm...
 
As evidence, Abramski states that the statute does
not regulate beyond the initial point of sale. Because the
law mostly addresses sales made by licensed dealers, a
purchaser can (within wide limits) subsequently decide to
resell his gun to another private party. See Reply Brief 11. And similarly, Abramski says, a purchaser can buy a
gun for someone else as a gift. See Brief for Petitioner 26–



















16 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court 27, n. 3. Abramski lumps in the same category the trans-fer of a gun from a nominal to a real buyer—as something,
like a later resale or gift, meant to fall outside the stat-ute’s (purported) standing-in-front-of-the-gun-dealer
scope. See Reply Brief 13; see also post, at 7–9. But Abramski and the dissent draw the wrong conclu-sion from their observations about resales and gifts. Yes,
Congress decided to regulate dealers’ sales, while leaving
the secondary market for guns largely untouched.

As we
noted in Huddleston, Congress chose to make the dealer
the “principal agent of federal enforcement” in “restricting
[criminals’] access to firearms.” 415 U. S., at 824. And
yes, that choice (like pretty much everything Congress
does) was surely a result of compromise. But no, straw
arrangements are not a part of the secondary market,
separate and apart from the dealer’s sale. In claiming as
much, Abramski merely repeats his mistaken assumption
that the “person” who acquires a gun from a dealer in a
case like this one is the straw, rather than the individual
who has made a prior arrangement to pay for, take pos-session of, own, and use that part of the dealer’s stock.
For all the reasons we have already given, that is not a
plausible construction of a statute mandating that the
dealer identify and run a background check on the person
to whom it is (really, not fictitiously) selling a gun. See
supra, at 9–15. The individual who sends a straw to a gun
store to buy a firearm is transacting with the dealer, in
every way but the most formal; and that distinguishes
such a person from one who buys a gun, or receives a gun
as a gift, from a private party.9
 
As evidence, Abramski states that the statute does
not regulate beyond the initial point of sale. Because the
law mostly addresses sales made by licensed dealers, a
purchaser can (within wide limits) subsequently decide to
resell his gun to another private party. See Reply Brief 11. And similarly, Abramski says, a purchaser can buy a
gun for someone else as a gift. See Brief for Petitioner 26–



















16 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court 27, n. 3. Abramski lumps in the same category the trans-fer of a gun from a nominal to a real buyer—as something,
like a later resale or gift, meant to fall outside the stat-ute’s (purported) standing-in-front-of-the-gun-dealer
scope. See Reply Brief 13; see also post, at 7–9. But Abramski and the dissent draw the wrong conclu-sion from their observations about resales and gifts. Yes,
Congress decided to regulate dealers’ sales, while leaving
the secondary market for guns largely untouched.

As we
noted in Huddleston, Congress chose to make the dealer
the “principal agent of federal enforcement” in “restricting
[criminals’] access to firearms.” 415 U. S., at 824. And
yes, that choice (like pretty much everything Congress
does) was surely a result of compromise. But no, straw
arrangements are not a part of the secondary market,
separate and apart from the dealer’s sale. In claiming as
much, Abramski merely repeats his mistaken assumption
that the “person” who acquires a gun from a dealer in a
case like this one is the straw, rather than the individual
who has made a prior arrangement to pay for, take pos-session of, own, and use that part of the dealer’s stock.
For all the reasons we have already given, that is not a
plausible construction of a statute mandating that the
dealer identify and run a background check on the person
to whom it is (really, not fictitiously) selling a gun. See
supra, at 9–15. The individual who sends a straw to a gun
store to buy a firearm is transacting with the dealer, in
every way but the most formal; and that distinguishes
such a person from one who buys a gun, or receives a gun
as a gift, from a private party.9
In case anyone has any doubt, the ATF and all of the goons who work for it are enemies of the US Constitution and definitely NOT our compatriots. Every single one of them.
 
husband buys a gun for a known felon( wife) and it is not a straw purchase?

Again, the ambiguity in the English language make the usage of "buys a gun for" imprecise absent the facts accompanying the sale. If a husband buy a gun as a gift for his wife, whose is a felon, it is not a straw purchase by that fact. Even the transfer by him may not be illegal if he doesn't know she is a felon. Her possession of it makes her a criminal.

As the Supreme Court makes clear in the case cited, and the quote above. even if the purchaser buys the gun for the express purpose of reselling it, it is not a straw purchase.

Here is another example I just thought of. Residents of Georgia, 18 year old daughter. She cannot buy a handgun from a FFL. Not because it is a violation of federal law for her to own one, but because it is a violation of federal law for the FFL to sell it to her. Dad can buy a handgun and either gift or sell it to her. Obvious intent to evade federal law, but not a straw purchase, and not illegal.
 
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